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Abstract 
This study aims to analyze whether open company costs in Latin America countries do 
vary asymmetrically. We used a 669 open companies sample in nine countries of that region 
from 1995 to 2012. We applied log linear regressions estimated by Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) for panel data, assembling time series to transversal data (cross-section). The results 
suggest that the behavior of selling, general and administrative (SGA) expenses is asymmetric 
with respect to changes in sales revenue (SR). This research shows that on average, when 
sales revenue increases by 1%, SGA 0.56% increase, but when the SR decreases by 1%, SGA 
decrease only 0.45%. The study confirmed the hypothesis of a possible reversal of the 
asymmetry when considering lags. However, this asymmetry seems to decrease when 
considering longer than one year. The results partially corroborate the results of the research 
of Anderson et al. (2003) performed with U.S. companies; He, Teruya and Shimizu (2010) 
who analyzed Japanese companies, and Costa, Medeiros and Silva (2005) that investigated 
Brazilian companies.  
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Introduction 
Three characteristics define traditionally cost behavior: they are proportional to the 
activity level; they can be fixed or variable concerning activity volume; it is asymmetrical the 
relationship between cost and activity volume (Noreen & Soderstrom, 1994). However, 
empiric studies on cost behavior (Brasch, 1927, Anderson, Banker, & Janakiraman, 2003, 
Costa, Medeiros & Silva, 2005, Balakrishnan & Gruca, 2008, He, Teruya, & Shimizu, 2010, 
Banker, Byzalov & Chen, 2013) suggest an asymmetrical variation on costs related to activity 
volume. In other words, the magnitude of in the cost increase changes is greater than the 
magnitude of this variation equivalent to a reduction of revenue. A company with sticky costs 
shows a greater drop in income when their activity level drops when compared with 
companies with less sticky costs (Weiss, 2010, Guenther, Riehe, & Röbler, 2013). 
Cost asymmetrical behavior is consistent to the argument that managers tend to adjust 
deliberately their resources as an answer to activity volume changes (Anderson et al., 2003). 
These authors identified that with selling reduction, managers tend to purposely delay the 
decision to reduce costs and expenses until they have greater certainty about the permanence 
of the decline in demand, keeping unused resources to avoid personal consequences when the 
retrenchment. Moreover, there may be a time gap between the cost reduction decision and 
achieving reduction. 
Asymmetry hypothesis was confirmed for samples formed by companies in the United 
States (Anderson et al., 2003), in Brazil (Costa et al., 2005); in the United States, England, 
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France and Germany (Calleja, Steliaros, & Thomas, 2006), in Japan (He et al., 2010), in 
Germany, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, 
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and 
United States of America (Banker et al., 2013), among some others. The legal system of the 
origin countries of these open companies can influence the magnitude of this asymmetry. For 
example, Calleja et al. (2006) and Steliaros and Thomas (2006) found that the variation in 
costs in France and Germany (country code-law regime) is more asymmetric than the 
variation in costs in England and the United States (countries of common arrangements law). 
This cost variation is defined not only in function of the selling  volume, because some 
other factors are determinant in its formation, such as: the location and size of the company, 
management incentives, corporate governance level, timing, macroeconomic factors, 
institutional factors, the legal system of the country of origin of the company, among others 
(Calleja et al., 2006, Banker & Chen, 2006, Baumgarten, Bonenkamp, & Homburg, 2010, 
Weiss, 2010; Chen, Lu, & Sougiannis 2012). 
Via Dalla and Perego (2012) analyzed Italian companies not listed in micro and macro 
level including specific business characteristics, magnitude of activity, performance sector. 
They Adapted to both the base model to analyze the asymmetric behavior of the proposed by 
Anderson et al. (2003) costs. The survey results suggest the absence of sticky costs in the 
Italian context behavior, corroborating the traditional literature that defines the behavior of 
costs as symmetric. 
Thus, the research problem arises as follows: do the Latin America company costs 
vary asymmetrically? This study aims to analyze whether the costs of Latin America open 
companies do vary asymmetrically. We used the methodology proposed by Anderson et al. 
(2003) in order to verify cost stickiness in panel data and log linear regressions estimated by 
OLS (Ordinary Least Squares). The sample consists of 669 public companies from nine 
countries in Latin America, from 1995 to 2012 
This research aims to analyze the asymmetry of costs, but will only examine the 
variation in selling, general and administrative (SGA) expenses in relation to the sale level. 
According to Chen et al. (2012), these expenses represent a significant portion of the cost of 
business operations and they are aligned with management interests and are susceptible to 
manipulations from corporate governance.  
Knowing cost behavior is essential for an efficient management in a company 
(Anderson et al., 2003). This is because many management decisions are based on knowledge 
of cost behavior in relation to the activity level in the company (Costa et al., 2005). Thus, the 
results of this research can be useful for practicing managers, shareholders, investors, analysts 
and especially for allowing the reduction of agency conflicts. Furthermore, this research can 
contribute to the overall literature on standard costs. Costa et al. (2006) argue that researches 
that contributes to understand the economic environment of the jurisdictions are required, as 
they bring out the similarities and differences between these countries, assisting in 
understanding this new globalized reality 
These surveys become important also in Latin America countries, because they have 
many common characteristics: the legal framework of the countries based on the code-law 
legal system, strong regulatory accounting exerted by governments, ownership structure based 
on stakeholder’s system, without accounting profession prestige, strong impact of tax laws on 
accounting, funding provided mainly by financial institutions (Costa et al., 2006). Among 
studies on symmetric costs we did not identify any comparative study on this behavior in 
Latin America countries, which have besides those characteristic have several blocks of 
economic integration, such as Latin America Integration Association (LAIA), Mercosul – 
South Common Market  and Andean Community. 
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This paper has six sections. After this introduction we present the literature review on 
cost behavior, Third section shows the search hypothesis; the fourth one describes the study 
methodology; the fifth one  present the results the last one the conclusions. 
 
Cost Behavior  
Studies on cost behavior are relevant to scholars, academicals and every professional 
involved in management activities (Oliveira, Lustosa, & Sales, 2007). These professionals 
make decisions which require knowing cost behavior related to the activity level. (Costa et al., 
2005). Garrison and Noreen (2001) state that management decisions made without knowing 
cost and their behavior can lead the company to insolvency. 
Cost behavior is used to describe how this resource responds to changes in activity 
level (Garrison & Noreen, 2001). According to Anderson et al. (2003), managers handle the 
increasing volume of expenses in that increased sales. However, when the volume of sales 
decreases, managers assess the possibility of such sales decline is temporary, opting to keep 
costs rather than incur adjustment costs. 
These managers decisions to maintain the same level of costs can also be caused by 
personal interests, resulting in a form of agency costs (Anderson et al., 2003). Jensen and 
Meckling (2008) define agency costs as the expenses incurred by the company caused by 
decisions of calculating managers who seek to maximize their personal utility, without taking 
into account the interests of shareholders. These administrators can keep unnecessary 
expenses to avoid personal consequences of containment, such as loss of status when the 
company is lowered, or the anguish of firing employees, contributing to the asymmetric cost 
behavior. 
 The cost stickiness occurs when managers decide to keep idle rather than adjusting the 
cost resources when there is a decrease in sales volume (Anderson et al., 2003). The reasons 
that lead managers to incur stickiness of costs are listed by Anderson et al. (2003): the agency 
costs that occur when the manager makes decisions according to their personal well-being, 
psychological adjustment costs that occur with layoffs, causing negative impact on the image 
of the administrator, and the need of time to confirm the reduction in market demand and, 
consequently, the volume of business activity. 
Anderson et al. (2003) analyzed industrial firms in the United States, where the main 
variables used were: selling expenses, general and administrative (SGA) and net sales. The 
authors found the prevalence of sticky costs for SGA behavior, showing the importance of 
managers in adapting resources in response to changes in market demand, while reducing the 
level of activities that utilize these resources 
The results of the research developed by Costa et al. (2005) corroborate partially the 
findings of Anderson et al. (2003). The Brazilian open companies that comprised the sample 
of this study showed an asymmetric elasticity of costs in relation to revenue and this 
asymmetry is partially reversed over time, corroborating the hypothesis of cost stickiness. 
However, these authors did not confirm the hypothesis that the asymmetry observed reduced 
over the years, justifying this as being possibly caused by more rigid labor laws applied to 
Brazilian companies. Countries with a more rigid (code-law) legislation may have a degree of 
asymmetry of the steeper costs (Banker et al., 2013). 
In Japan, public companies also showed an asymmetrical relationship of costs (He et 
al., 2010). Despite the Japanese labor laws do not be as rigid as the layoffs, the decision to fire 
the employees takes time, since managers tend to wait for confirmation of permanent demand 
reduction to reduce costs (He et al., 2010). To these authors, the asymmetrical behavior may 
be justified for two main facts: 1) managers believe that the market reacts negatively to a 
reduction of costs, 2) the image of managers may be compromised in the face of reduced 
expenses with hand labor. This attitude can be characterized with a conflict of agency, since 
the manager favors personal interest. Nonetheless, not only would the agency theory a 
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possible explanation for this fact. To Banker et al. (2013), a possible explanation for the 
asymmetrical behavior of costs in relation to revenue would be the economic theory of 
optimizing the decision, stating the search managers for a great decision on the adjustment 
costs. Managers can also have great conviction future demands, and the decision not to "cut" 
the excess costs in preparation for these future increases in activity level (He et al., 2010). 
Kama and Weiss (2013) show that agency theory can be adjusted by smoothing cost 
stickiness. Encouraging managers to align their personal goals with the institution can be 
considered a technical maneuver in designing Kama and Weiss (2013), since the incentives 
for optimization of results, as subsidies, driving managers to achieve the goals and defined 
objectives. Thus, the company can minimize the agency conflict, providing also the reduction 
of the asymmetry between the costs. 
We emphasize that manager influence is related to expectations  on future demands for 
their products (Anderson et al., 2003, He et al., 2010, Kama & Weiss, 2013). This is due to 
the decision makers in maintaining or not the surplus spent, material, labor, and other 
elements of the production process, the time of these decisions reduction may be related. For 
Kama and Weiss (2013) the results show that when future sales expectations are perceived by 
managers as more "pessimistic" a reduction is observed in the asymmetry of costs, since there 
is a more immediate reduction in production costs to reduced revenues. In the opposite 
situation, managers are "optimistic" about the future market behavior and even with the drop 
in revenue, they tend to keep the costs of production for a longer period, thus boosting the 
asymmetry of costs. 
 
Hypothesis 
Following the model proposed by Anderson et al. (2003), which was adapted by Costa 
et al. (2005) for the investigation of sticky costs, four hypotheses will be tested in this 
research. The first one is that cost behavior is asymmetric in relation to revenue. This may be 
caused by the fact that changes in the volume of sales are not accompanied by the managers’ 
decision making, suggesting that weak demand variation does not lead to a decision to reduce 
or increase the immediate costs by managers (Costa et al., 2005). Thus, our first hypothesis is 
that: 
 H1: The magnitude of the increase in SGA expenses due to increased sales in publicly 
held companies in Latin America in the period 1997 to 2012 was greater than the magnitude 
of its reduction in case of falling sales in the same period 
The considered divergence between the reduction or increase of costs against the 
behavior of increase or decrease in income, may also be linked to other reasons such as 
agency conflict, which may be indicated in this case because the managers have a concern 
about your image social, in order that a wrong decision may over time prove the most 
appropriate, impairing its performance. As shown by Anderson et al. (2003) and Costa et al. 
(2005), changes in demand can be something momentary. In this case, a wrong decision could 
incur higher costs, since the reversal of the situation may or may not occur quickly.  
The temporal question then is another item that should be checked when it is expected 
to make the analysis of a single period alone does not take into account the adjustment costs in 
relation to the variation of the amount of revenues that are more permanently, thus these 
conditions the asymmetry tends to be more conspicuous. In order to evaluate this 
presupposition, we formulate the second hypothesis: 
H2: The level of asymmetry of SGA expenses in publicly held companies in Latin 
America in the period 1997-2012 is mitigated with the aggregation of periods 
 The equalization of costs to fluctuations in sales volume cannot be limited to the 
contemporary environment, but still lagged way, i.e., the expectation is that cost stickiness is 
reduced when it is observed in lag of one period. With the intention to test this has been the 
third hypothesis: 
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H3: The investigated Public companies in Latin America underwent adjustment of 
expenditure SGA regarding changes of sales. 
When managers note the occurrence of a variation in sale volume they tend to wait for a final 
decision regarding cost variation. Labor laws rigidity can also hamper efforts to minimize 
costs given the decline in the level of activities, resulting in cost stickiness. Considering the 
possible delay in decision making cost reduction on the reduction in the volume of activities, 
the stickiness observed in one period may be reversed in subsequent periods. Thus we 
formulate the fourth hypothesis to be checked for this search: 
H4: Public companies from Latin America revert the cost stickiness in subsequent 
periods. 
 
Methods 
This is a descriptive quantitative research using the methodology developed by 
Anderson et al. (2003) to measure cost stickiness. This methodology involves log-linear 
regressions estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for panel data, assembling temporal 
series to transversal data (cross-section). To ensure the robustness of this research results were 
tested three types of models for panel data: the constant coefficient (pooled), the fixed effects) 
and random effects (random effects). As the sample involves a variety of different industries 
and sizes of companies, the log-linear specification improves the comparability of variables 
between firms and reduces the potential for heteroskedasticity (Anderson et al., 2003). 
Anderson et al.’s methodology (2003), used in this study, was effective in identifying 
cost stickiness to revenue for U.S. companies. The work carried out by Costa et al. (2005) 
with Brazilian companies also demonstrated that the model is effective to measure the sticky 
costs. Later, other authors have also confirmed the effectiveness of this methodology for the 
measurement of sticky costs (Calleja et al., 2006, He et al., 2010, Kama & Weiss, 2013). 
Models I and II, developed by Anderson et al. (2003) to assess asymmetry costs are 
shown in Equations 1 and 2, respectively. 
                        (Eq.1)                   
 
                   (Eq.2)
 
 
 
 
Dummy variable assumes value 1 when the sale liquid revenue (SLR) decreases 
between t and t-1 periods, and zero when the contrary happens. β1 coefficient measures the 
percent change, sale, general and administrative expenses (SGA) with an increase of 1% in 
SLR. The sum of β1 and β2 coefficients results in percentage change in VGA with a 1% 
reduction in RLV. For the first research hypothesis (H1) is not rejected, the coefficient β1 
must be greater than zero and the coefficient β2 should be significantly less than zero. 
To test the second research hypothesis (H2), that stickiness cost of public companies 
from Latin America decline with the aggregation of periods, the model I regressions were 
estimated for aggregate periods of 1, 2, 3 and 4 years. 
Model II (Equation 2) is used to test the third and the fourth hypotheses. The 
coefficient β3 indicates the lagged effect of the variation in costs of revenues (H3). It is 
expected that this coefficient is significant and positive. The coefficient β4 measures the 
reversal of asymmetric costs in subsequent periods (H4). 
The conditions for the research hypotheses are not rejected are summarized in Table 1 
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Table 1: Conditions for not rejecting hypothesis 
Hipothesis Expected effect 
H1 β1 > 0, β2 < 0, β1+ β2 < 1 
H2 β2 decreases in absolute value with the aggregation of years per 
 H3 β3 > 0 
H4 β4 > 0, β4  < |𝛽2| 
Source: Costa et al. (2005) 
To test the research hypotheses we used a set of unbalanced panel data of listed 
companies in nine countries in Latin America (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa 
Rica, Jamaica, Mexico, Peru, Venezuela) with available data on the basis of Thompson 
Reuters data for the period 1995-2012 (Table 2). 
Table 2: Countries, company and observation amount 
Country Acronym Company 
 
Observation 
 Argentina ARG           56          896  
Brazil BRA         225       3.600  
Chile  CHL         130       2.080  
Colombia  COL           45          720  
Costa 
  
CRI             3            48  
Jamaica  JAM           17          272  
Mexico  MEX           81       1.296  
Peru  PER           92       1.472  
Venezuela VEM           20          320  
Amount         669      10.704  
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
 
Initially, this database had 1,364 listed companies located in Latin America, and only 
868 had data for net sales and selling, general and administrative disclosed for the period of 
study. We excluded companies that did not have data in at least eight years of the time 
horizon of the study, resulting in a sample of 669 companies and 12,042 data. We also 
excluded the observations in 1995 and 1996, because they were used only for calculating 
lagged variables, resulting in a final sample of 10,704 observations and 669 public companies. 
Due to the different currencies of each country in the sample, data were collected in U.S. 
dollars. Thus, the research sample consists of listed companies of Latin America accounting 
information disclosed in that currency. 
Results and Discussions 
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics segregated by country component of the sample.  
Table 3: Descriptive statistics per country     
Country Variable Quant. Average % Pattern 
 
Minimum Median Maximum 
ARG RLV 731 0,043    0,216  -2,142 0,046  3,113  VGA 724 0,029  67% 0,198  -1,131 0,038  1,788  
BRA RLV 3.068 0,031   
0,189  -2,229 0,040  1,790  
VGA 3.037 0,022  70% 0,186  -1,360 0,029  2,056  
CHL RLV 1.697 0,037    0,219  -2,911 0,042  2,619  VGA 1.669 0,029    0,223  -2,538 0,033  2,219  
COL RLV 585 0,049   
0,208  -0,630 0,041  3,817  
VGA 582 0,031  64% 0,165  -0,820 0,038  1,478  
CRI RLV 32 0,063    0,153  -0,356 0,075  0,317  VGA 32 0,061    0,163  -0,441 0,041  0,408  
JAM RLV 219 0,017   
0,156  -0,923 0,030  0,425  
VGA 218 0,016  93% 0,169  -0,741 0,025  0,569  
MEX RLV 999 0,036    0,285  -3,726 0,044  3,074  VGA 991 0,027    0,223  -2,438 0,033  2,278  
PER RLV 1.209 0,031   
0,190  -1,183 0,035  1,442  
VGA 1.204 0,024  79% 0,186  -1,340 0,028  2,172  
VEM RLV 305 0,033    0,119  -0,379 0,034  0,691  VGA 305 0,026  77% 0,136  -0,448 0,036  0,544  
América RLV 8.845 0,035  
 
0,209  -3,726 0,040  3,817  
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Latina VGA 8.762 0,025  73% 0,196  -2,538 0,031  2,278  
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
The total valid for the variable 'net sales' (SRV) observations is 8,845, whereas the 
Latin American region, and 8,762 for the variable 'selling, general and administrative' (SGA). 
Brazil is the country with the largest number of observations in the sample (3,068 to 3,037 for 
SRV and SGA). On the opposite side is Costa Rica with 32 observations for SRV variation of 
listed companies in Latin America averaged 0.035, i.e. the SRV increased on average 3.5% 
from 1995 to 2012. This variable has a median of 0.040, close to the average value of 0.035, 
which suggests that the average is not affected by extremely high or low values of SRV 
(Table 3). The mean change from SGA was 0.025, suggesting that the costs of sales, general 
and administrative of public companies in Latin America increased by 2.5% on average over 
the time horizon of the study. The variation of the SGA of the listed companies in Latin 
America represents 73% of the variation of the SRV. The lowest average SRV was the listed 
companies of Jamaica (0.017), but the SGA expenses represent 93% of RLV. 
Descriptive statistics of the SRV and SGA, segregated by sampling period are presented in 
Tables 4 and 5, respectively. 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics per  year  SRV 
Year SRV Quant. Averag
 
Pattern 
 
Minimum Median Maximum 
1997  266  0,034 0,176 -1,486 0,027 1,137 
1998  337  -0,003 0,168 -1,121 -0,005 1,062 
1999  406  -0,038 0,271 -1,345 -0,034 3,817 
2000  450  0,041 0,253 -1,169 0,028 3,113 
2001  475  -0,015 0,170 -1,778 -0,010 1,089 
2002  512  -0,087 0,193 -1,504 -0,052 0,613 
2003  550  0,069 0,175 -1,104 0,078 1,196 
2004  590  0,090 0,140 -1,372 0,084 1,442 
2005  636  0,084 0,186 -2,229 0,082 1,613 
2006  648  0,069 0,157 -1,366 0,058 1,146 
2007  657  0,088 0,298 -3,726 0,090 3,074 
2008  662  0,008 0,155 -0,957 -0,002 1,153 
2009  663  0,052 0,189 -0,659 0,051 1,788 
2010  665  0,081 0,213 -1,182 0,069 2,619 
2011  664  -0,006 0,258 -3,078 0,018 0,899 
2012  664  0,016 0,163 -1,094 0,028 1,324 
Total 8.845  0,035 0,209 -3,726 0,040 3,817 
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
We noticed that the number of observations for SRV (Table 4) and SGA (Table 5) 
variables increased over the time horizon of the study. In addition, the mean change in net 
income and the change in selling, general and administrative expenses are negative for the 
years 1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2011 (2012 only for VGA). 
Table 5: Descriptive statistics per  year SGA 
Year sGA Quant. Averag
 
Pattern 
 
Minimum Median Maximum 
1997  258  0,036 0,176 -0,814 0,023 1,646 
1998  326  -0,002 0,151 -1,128 0,000 0,821 
1999  400  -0,041 0,179 -0,869 -0,041 1,478 
2000  442  0,016 0,186 -1,001 0,011 1,788 
2001  469  -0,003 0,158 -0,905 -0,007 0,949 
2002  506  -0,091 0,191 -1,340 -0,068 1,640 
2003  541  0,046 0,191 -2,538 0,047 1,150 
2004  585  0,070 0,175 -0,536 0,064 2,278 
2005  633  0,083 0,163 -1,131 0,072 2,056 
2006  647  0,084 0,160 -0,688 0,059 1,690 
2007  652  0,087 0,217 -1,186 0,074 1,624 
2008  661  0,004 0,178 -1,017 -0,006 2,149 
2009  661  0,065 0,160 -1,096 0,063 0,839 
2010  659  0,051 0,187 -0,910 0,052 2,219 
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2011  660  -0,047 0,225 -2,438 -0,007 1,045 
2012  662  -0,010 0,254 -1,920 0,020 0,984 
Total 8.762  0,025 0,196 -2,538 0,031 2,278 
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
Table 6 presents the results of Chow, Lagrange Multiplier (ML) of Brusch and Pagan 
and Hausman tests for the Latin American sample. The Brusch and Pagan and Chow test 
suggest that pooled ist he most appropriate model. The Hausman test indicates the model as 
fixed as appropriate. Thus, the test results show that the model common intercept (pooled) is 
the most suitable for both the Model I (Equation 1), and for Model II (Equation 2). 
Table 6: Chow, LM and Hausman tests– América Latina 
Model Breusch and  
Hausman Chow Suiktable 
specification Chi2 Prob Chi2 Prob Chi2 Prob 
I 0,00 1,00 22,90 0,00 0,61 1,00 Pool 
 II 0,00 1,00 22,81 0,00 0,64 1,00 Pool 
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
From the results of Table 6 data, we present the regression results for the three panel 
data models (pooled, fixed and random), but we will comment only the results of the more 
suitable, model, pooled. Besides the coefficients and the statistics t, we will present R2, F 
statistics and the observation number. 
The results of estimation of model I (Equation 1), using the constant coefficient 
(pooled regression) are shown in Table 7. For the Latin America country sample, the 
significant value of the coefficient β1 (0.560) indicates that the cost of sales, general and 
administrative (SGA) increased 0.56% for a 1% increase in sales (SRV). The negative and 
significant sign of the coefficient β2 (-0.107) shows that, in a similar way to the United States 
(Anderson et al., 2003), to Japan (He et al., 2010) and Brazil (Costa et al., 2005), SGA OF 
Latin America present sticky behavior. The combination of the β1 and β2 values (0.560 to 
0.107 = 0.453) shows that the SGA decrease only 0.45% for a 1% reduction in SRV. The fact 
that β1 and β1 and β2 sum to be significantly smaller than 1 shows that the SGA are not 
proportional to the variations of the recipe. With this result, considering the sample of listed 
companies in Latin America, the H1 hypothesis SGA asymmetry with respect to variations of 
the SRV is also not rejected in this study. 
Table 7: Model I  - Estimate Coeficients ( T statistics) – Pooled Regression 
  Lat Am ARG BRA CHL COL CRI JAM MEX PER VEM 
β0     0,001  -0,012   0,004  0,002 0,016 -0,010 -0,005 0,005 -0,004 0,003 
   (0,59)  (-2,07) (1,15) (0,47) (2,81) (-0,43) (-0,39) (0,83) (-0,75) (0,31) 
β1     0,560    0,701  0,427 0,591    0,499    1,016    0,736    0,521    0,709    0,750  
   (44,61)  (23,82) (16,01) (19,84) (18,88) (6,36) (5,78) (15,98) (20,90) (10,41) 
β2 -0,107 -0,224 -0,091 -0,102 0,291 -0,211 -0,200 -0,494 -0,152 0,065 
   (-5,6)  (-4,24) (-2,28) (-2,21) (3,82)  (-0,70) (-1,15) (-1,16) (-2,87) (0,42) 
F     1.926  402,87 268,92 359,45 297,56 46,02 51,00 368,55 437,86 124,91 
R 0,307 0,528 0,152 0,303 0,508 0,760 0,322 0,431 0,422 0,453 
N     8.701  719    3.013   .655  580    32  218  978    1.201  305  
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
 
Although the results of Chow, Lagrange Multiplier (LM) of Brusch and Pagan and 
Hausman tests suggest that common intercept model (pooled) is the most suitable for the 
research sample (Table 6), the results of the estimation of Model I (equation 1), using the 
fixed effects model, a random effects and are shown in Tables 8 and 9, respectively, for 
comparison purposes. 
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Tabela 8: Modelo I  - Coeficientes Estimados (estatística t) – Fixed Efects 
  ALATINA ARG BRA CHL COL CRI JAM MEX PER VEM 
β0     0,001  -0,010 0,004 0,002 0,018 -0,005 -0,002 0,005 -0,006 0,002 
  (0,50) (-1,95) (0,88) (0,43) (3,05) (-0,20) (0,11) (0,81) (-1,05) (0,21) 
β1     0,551    0,694    0,420  0,590    0,481    1,053    0,703    0,500    0,725    0,749  
  (39,78) (22,80) (13,82) (17,60) (17,21) (6,12) (5,15) (14,12) (19,21) (9,59) 
β2 -0,118 -0,212 -0,115 -0,105 0,318 0,018 -0,127 -0,628 -0,184 0,038 
  (-5,36) (-3,83) (-2,34) (-1,95) (3,95) (0,05) (-0,67) (-1,33) (-3,06) (0,22) 
F     1.619  377,79 220,12 314,85 259,87 41,24 44,23 285,67 386,71 108,91 
R 0,287 0,533 0,137 0,293 0,494 0,753 0,308 0,389 0,411 0,435 
N     8.701  719    3.013  1.655  580    32  218  978    1.201  305  
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
We noticed that SGA H1 sticky hypothesis regarding variations of the SRV is not 
rejected using the three models for panel data: pooled (Table 7), fixed (Table 8) and random 
(Table 9). 
SGA H1 stickiness neither is rejected to open companies in Argentina, Brazil, Chile 
and Peru (Table 7). This is due to the fact that besides the coefficient β1 being positive and 
significant, the coefficient β2 is negative and significant for these countries. It is noteworthy 
that the coefficient β1 is positive and significant for all countries in the sample, suggesting 
that variations in costs are not proportional to revenue changes. 
Table 9: Model I –  t statistics Estimated Coefficients– Random Efects 
  ALATINA ARG BRA CHL COL CRI JAM MEX PER VEM 
β0     0,001  -0,011   0,004  0,002 0,016 -0,010 -0,005 0,005 -0,004 0,003 
  (0,59) (-1,37) (1,15) (0,47) (2,78) (-0,43) (-0,39) (0,83) (-0,75) (0,31) 
β1     0,560    0,698  0,4273 0,591    0,498    1,016    0,736    0,521    0,709    0,750  
  (44,61) (23,73) (16,01) (19,84) (18,81) (6,36) (5,78) (15,98) (20,90) (10,41) 
β2 -0,107 -0,224 -0,091 -0,102 0,292 -0,211 -0,200 -0,049 -0,152 0,065 
  (-5,60) (-4,23) (-2,28) (-2,21) (3,83) (-0,70) (-1,15) (-1,16) (-2,87) (0,42) 
Wald chi2(2)     3.851  805,8 537,85 718,91 592,65 92,04 102,01 737,09 875,72 249,82 
R 0,287 0,533 0,136 0,293 0,494 0,749 0,307 0,389 0,411 0,435 
N     8.701  719    3.013  1.655  580    32  218  978    1.201  305  
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
H2 Hyphothesis that cost stickiness decreases with period aggregation is rejected 
according to the results of Model I estimative for multiple periods (Table 10). The signs and 
significance of the β1 and β2 coefficients estimated for periods of 2, 3 and 4 are similar to 
those estimated for Model I (one year - Equation 1). 
The value of the coefficients β1 and β2 decreases with the aggregation of periods. The 
combination of these coefficients (β1 + β2) results in an asymmetric variation of 0.45%, 
0.42%, 0.42% and 0.39% for periods of 1 year, 2 years, 3 years and 4 years respectively. 
These results suggest an increase in the SGA stickiness with the aggregation of periods. 
Table 10:  Model I – Period aggregation 
t statistic estimated coefficients 
Pooled 
  1 year period 2 years period 3 years period 4 years period 
β0                     
  
                        
  
                        
  
                        
     (0,59)  (1,02) (0,62) (1,48) 
β1                     
  
                        
  
                        
  
                        
     (44,61)  (26,72) (23,66) (20,09) 
β2 -0,107 -0,084 -0,088 -0,079 
   (-5,60)  (-2,74) (-2,64) (-2,20) 
F                     
  
                        
  
                        
  
                        
  N                   
  
                      
  
                      
  
                      
  Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
 
The rejection of the hypothesis of decreasing asymmetry of VGA open Latin 
American companies investigated, for 1995-2002 period with period aggregation confirms 
Costa et al.’s findings (2005) concerning to Brazil. However, it does not confirm those from 
Anderson et al. (2003) regarding the United States neither those from He et al. (2010) related 
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to Japan. Costa et al. (2005) suggest greater rigidity of the Brazilian labor legislation as 
justification for H2 rejection. This justification was also presented by Calleja et al. (2006). For 
these authors, countries legal system code law (such as Brazil) may have a more pronounced 
cost stickiness and can take longer to make the decision to reduce costs in the face of reduced 
revenues. This fact can be explained by these countries present a weak corporate governance 
system, and a least developed market, which can cause greater agency costs. 
Table 11 illustrates the results of estimation of model II (Equation 2) using the pooled 
regression model (as results of Table 6). The values and significance of the coefficients β1 
(0.573) and β2 (-0.107), for Latin America, are similar to those found in Model I (Table 6). 
The β3 (0.026), positive and significant coefficient suggests an outdated SGA in for a change 
in the sales effect, corroborating the hypothesis H3. This hypothesis is confirmed in studies 
carried out by Anderson et al. (2003), concerning to the United States, and that one done by 
He et al. (2010), in relation to Japan, however, this hypothesis is rejected in Costa et al.’s 
study (2005), for Brazil. These authors suggest a rigid labor laws in Brazil as justification for 
this result. 
 The β4 (0.065) coefficient is positive, significant and smaller than the β2 coefficient 
leading to non-rejection of the hypothesis H4 that sticky SGA in Latin American open 
companies are reversed in subsequent periods (Table 11). This hypothesis is neither rejected 
by Anderson et al. (2003), He et al. (2010) and Costa et al. (2005). 
Table 11: Model II – t statistic estimated coefficients - Pooled 
  ALATINA ARG BRA CHL COL CRI JAM MEX PER VEM 
β0 
-0,001 -0,011   0,002  0,004 -0,013 0,017 -0,012 0,009 -0,009 -0,002 
(-0,54) (-1,81) (0,41) (0,66) (-1,86) (0,90) (-0,81) (1,28) (-1,64) (-0,17) 
β1 
 
    0,573    0,676  0,437   0,546    0,840    1,020    0,772    0,456    0,748    0,761  
(39,23) (21,66) (14,97) (17,12) (16,35) (8,52) (5,80) (9,48) (20,85) (10,32) 
β2 
 
-0,107 -0,276 -0,058 0,006 -0,182 0,138 -0,391 0,020 -0,227 0,037 
(-4,97) (-4,78) (-1,32) (0,12) (-1,86) (0,58) (-2,01) (0,35) (-3,99) (0,23) 
β3 
 
    0,026  - 0,055  0,104   0,003    0,030  - 0,111    0,050    0,003    0,009    0,582  
(2,58) (-1,95) (4,56) (0,11) (1,27) (-1,20) (0,70) (0,15) (0,34) (0,92) 
β4 
 
0,065   0,061  0,032 0,054 0,060 -0,542 0,090 0,095 0,067 -0,031 
(3,62) (1,37) (0,90) (1,14) (1,00) (-2,93) (0,62) (2,24) (1,45) (-0,30) 
F   839  158  141,11 160,67 133,3 48,3 17,65 142,82 201,22 60,4 
R 0,293 0,488 0,166 0,297 0,500 0,885 0,262 0,388 0,421 0,456 
N     8.096  668    2.818    1.525  539    30  204  907    1.112  293  
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
For comparison, Tables 12 and 13 present the results of the estimation of Model II 
(Eq. 2) using the fixed effects model and random effects respectively. 
Table 12 – Modelo II - t statistic estimated coefficients - Fixed 
  ALATINA ARG BRA CHL COL CRI JAM MEX PER VEM 
β0 -0,001 -0,009 0,001 0,005 -0,010 0,033 -0,008 0,011 -0,012 -0,004 
 (-0,54) (-1,44) (0,27) (0,89) (-1,37) (1,69) (-0,51) (1,62) (-2,10) (-0,41) 
β1 
 
    0,569    0,665    0,437    0,535    0,814    0,926    0,745    0,409    0,778    0,779  
 (35,31) (20,52) (13,39) (14,78) (14,80) (7,66) (5,20) (7,84) (19,40) (9,61) 
β2 
 
-0,121 -0,230 -0,079 0,028 -0,143 0,562 -0,297 0,036 -0,284 -0,027 
 (-4,94) (-3,75) (-1,52) (0,50) (-1,36) (2,06) (-1,37) (0,56) (-4,38) (-0,15) 
β3 
 
    0,008  - 0,048    0,081  - 0,010    0,029  - 0,028    0,042  - 0,028    0,002    0,054  
 (0,77) (-1,62) (3,29) (-0,38) (1,17) (-0,26) (0,54) (-1,24) (0,08) (0,81) 
β4 
 
0,087 0,034 0,063 0,068 0,025 -0,592 0,206 0,129 0,089 -0,012 
 (4,53) (0,74) (1,65) (1,34) (0,39) (-3,47) (1,25) (2,91) (1,84) (-0,12) 
F   699  151  114  140  114,03 46,95 15,56 105,08 178,9 52,17 
R 0,274 0,499 0,150 0,286 0,482 0,891 0,254 0,338 0,413   0,437  
N     8.096  668    2.818    1.525  539    30  204  907    1.112  293  
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
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Table 13: Modelo II - t statistic estimated coefficients - Random 
  ALATINA ARG BRA CHL COL CRI JAM MEX PER VEM 
β0 -0,001 -0,010 0,002 0,004 -0,012 0,017 -0,012 0,009 -0,009 -0,002 
 (-0,54) (-1,47) (0,41) (0,66) (-1,80) (0,90) (-0,81) (1,28) (-1,64) (-0,17) 
β1 
 
    0,573    0,673    0,437    0,546    0,839    1,021    0,772    0,456    0,748    0,761  
 (39,23) (21,51) (14,97) (17,12) (16,30) (8,52) (5,80) (9,48) (20,85) (10,32) 
β2 
 
-0,107 -0,272 -0,058 0,006 -0,181 0,139 -0,391 0,020 -0,227 0,037 
 (-4,97) (-4,70) (-1,32) (0,12) (-1,85) (0,58) (-2,01) (0,35) (-3,99) (0,23) 
β3 
 
    0,026  - 0,056    0,104    0,003    0,030  - 0,111    0,050    0,003    0,009    0,058  
 (2,58) (-2,00) (4,56) (0,11) (1,27) (-1,20) (0,70) (0,15) (0,34) (0,92) 
β4 
 
0,065 0,057 0,032 0,054 0,059 -0,543 0,090 0,095 0,067 -0,031 
 (3,62) (1,29) (0,90) (0,14) (0,97) (-2,93) (0,62) (2,24) (1,45) (-0,30) 
Wald chi2(2)     3.356  630  564  643  530,75 193,18 70,61 571,27 804,89 241,58 
R 0,273 0,499 0,150 0,286 0,482 0,876 0,251 0,337 0,413   0,437  
N     8.096  668    2.818    1.525  539    30  204  907    1.112  293  
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
Table 14 shows the results of the hypotheses tested in this study (current column) 
compared the results found by Anderson et al. (ABJ, 2003), He et al. (HTS 2010) and Costa et 
al. (CMS, 2005). 
 
Table 14: Result synthesis 
 Current ABJ (2003) HTS (2010) CMS (2005) 
H1 – SGA stickiness related to SRV Not 
j d 
Não é 
j i d  
Não é 
j i d  
Não é 
j i d  H2 - Cost stickiness decreases with period 
aggregation  
Rejected Not rejected Not rejected Rejected 
H3 – SGA lagged setting forth variations of 
SRV  
Not 
j d 
Not rejected Not rejected Rejected 
H4 – reversal of SGA stickiness subsequent 
periods. 
Not 
rejected 
Not rejected Not rejected Not rejected 
Source: Elaborated by the searchers 
 
Conclusion 
This research analyzed cost behavior, investigating the existence of cost sticky 
behavior of listed companies in Latin America. The survey sample consists of 669 public 
companies from nine countries in the region, from 1995 to 2012. 
Our findings highlight the asymmetric cost behavior in relation to changes in sales 
revenue for the listed countries of Latin America object of study companies. In other words, 
on average, when the sales revenue (SRV) increases 1%, selling, general and administrative 
expense (SGA) increased 0.56%, but when the SRV decreases by 1%, SGA decrease only 
0.45%. These results are consistent with those found for public companies in the United 
States, Brazil and Japan found respectively by Anderson et al. (2003), Costa et al. (2005) and 
He et al. (2010). 
Considering specifically the results of the sample of listed companies in Latin 
America, H1 hypothesis, on cost stickiness in relation to changes in revenue, is confirmed in 
this study. H2 hypothesis that cost stickiness decreases with addition of periods is rejected 
since the results show an increase in the asymmetry of the cost of adding periods. A 
conjecture for the fact that this hypothesis has not been confirmed in this study may be the 
rigidity of labor laws of code-law countries. H3 hypothesis that there is a lagged adjustment 
costs in relation to revenue variations, is neither rejected. H4 hypothesis, that stickiness costs 
are reversed in subsequent years, was confirmed. 
The results of this study show the importance of facing the development of new 
models of analysis of cost behavior scientific research. The inclusion of quantitative methods 
in cost analysis can assist accountants, shareholders, managers, analysts and other 
professionals involved in the review process to identify the asymmetric cost behavior, 
committed to adjusting the level of activities and resources more effectively timing. 
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Furthermore, monitoring asymmetric costs can reduce agency costs, since the reluctance to 
adjust resources in response to changes in demand may involve personal considerations. 
Latin America currently has about twenty countries, but the sample of this research 
consists of nine of these countries, which prevents generalization of results. For future 
research, we suggest to investigate the magnitude of the cost stickiness in relation to 
contingent factors, such as size, sector, strategy, perceived stage of life cycle and 
environmental uncertainty as well the intensity level of competition, production technology 
and technology management. Moreover, it could be relevant to conduct researches to identify 
factors that could determine the reversion, or not, the asymmetry in lags and also to identify 
why the asymmetry decreases in costs not exceeding one year. 
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